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Abstract—A homomorphic public key crypto-scheme based on the Boolean Satisfiability Problem is proposed. The public key is a SAT
formula satisfied by the private key. Probabilistic encryption generates functions implied to be false by the public key XOR the message
bits. A zero-knowledge proof is used to provide signatures.
Index Terms—Public key cryptosystems, Cryptographic protocols, Data Encryption, Message authentication, Digital signatures.
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1 INTRODUCTION
U
NLIKE the symmertic ones, asymmetric crypto-
graphy schemes predominantly used today are
vulnerable (at least) to attacks from quantum
computers using Shor’s algorithm. Assuming
P6=NP and that NP-hard problems can not be solved ef-
ficiently, not even on a quantum computer, cryptography
based on NP-hard problems is dubbed “post-quantum”.
Daniel Bernstein [1] lists Hash-based, Code-based, Lattice-
based, and Multivariate-quadratic-equations cryptography
as the existing post-quantum algorithms. The aim of this
paper is to introduce a different crypto-system based on
the Boolean Satisfiability Problem (SAT). This problem of
finding a pre-image of 1 under a Boolean function given in
a certain conjunctive form (see Section 2) is well known to be
NP-complete. Although a SAT instance can, from a certain
angle, be viewed as a multivariate-equation, our crypto-
scheme is different from the systems mentioned above. In
particular, we use a fulfilling assignment as the secret key
rather than a trap door.
Using SAT to provide a post-quantum key pair is not
a far-fetched idea. The main point of this paper is how to
use them to encrypt and decrypt. To this end, we randomly
produce Boolean functions which are implied to be false by
the public key and hence evaluate to 0 on the private key.
These functions ⊕ the message bits form the ciphertext.
The paper is organised as follows: We illustrate the main
point of using randomness for encryption in a (somewhat
over simplified) picture in Figure 1. The guiding example
in Section 1.1 illustrates the main ideas more accurately. In
Section 2, we describe and discuss our algorithms in detail.
The probabilistic scheme introduced there is vulnerable to
an oracle attack, which is discussed in Section 3, as well
as some other attacks. In this section we also compute
bounds for the parameters of the encryption to resist all
mentioned attacks and also explain how the oracle attack
can be countered. In Section 5 we introduce an identifica-
tion and signature scheme, which is independent from the
encryption. We conclude in Section 6.
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1.1 Example
Before explaining the key generation and encryption al-
gorithm in detail, we start with a simple toy example to
guide the readers intuition. A possible1 private/public key
pair for Alice is:
priv = (1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 0, 0) (1)
pub = (x¯1 ∨ x¯2 ∨ x¯3) ∧ (x¯1 ∨ x4 ∨ x5) (2)
∧ (x1 ∨ x6 ∨ x7) (3)
since pub(priv) = 1. Bob wants to send a bit y ∈ B to Alice.
He rewrites
c¯1 = x1x2x3 (4)
c¯2 = x1 ⊕ x1x4 ⊕ x1x5 ⊕ x1x4x5 (5)
c¯3 = 1⊕ x1 ⊕ x6 ⊕ x7 ⊕ x1x6 ⊕ x1x7 ⊕ x6x7 (6)
⊕ x1x6x7 (7)
and randomly generates
R2,3 = x4 ⊕ x5 ⊕ x6 ⊕ x4x5 ⊕ x4x6x7 (8)
⊕ x5x6x7 ⊕ x4x5x6x7 (9)
R1,3 = 1⊕ x2x3 ⊕ x6x7 ⊕ x2x3x6x7 (10)
R1,2 = 1⊕ x4 ⊕ x5 ⊕ x2x3 ⊕ x4x5 . (11)
The ciphertext is
g = c¯1R2,3 ⊕ c¯2R1,3 ⊕ c¯3R1,2 (12a)
= y ⊕ 1⊕ x4 ⊕ x5 ⊕ x6 ⊕ x7 ⊕ x1x6 ⊕ x1x7 (12b)
⊕ x2x3 ⊕ x4x5 ⊕ x4x6 ⊕ x4x7 ⊕ x5x6 ⊕ x5x7 (12c)
⊕ x6x7 ⊕ x1x4x6 ⊕ x1x4x7 ⊕ x1x5x6 ⊕ x1x5x7 (12d)
⊕ x2x3x6 ⊕ x2x3x7 ⊕ x4x5x6 ⊕ x4x5x7 (12e)
⊕ x4x6x7 ⊕ x5x6x7 ⊕ x1x2x3x7 ⊕ x1x4x5x6 (12f)
⊕ x1x4x5x7 ⊕ x2x3x6x7 ⊕ x4x5x6x7 (12g)
Bob sends the ciphertext g for the cleartext y to Alice, who
decodes g(priv) = y.
Mallet can attack the scheme above by replacing a literal
in g by a truth value, say x3 7→ 1. He sends the modified
ciphertext to Alice and from Alice’s reply, he will notice
whether Alice received the correct bit or not. Hence he
1. Of course, the ratio of clauses to variables in realistic keys needs to
be much larger (see Appendix E) and also the key length needs to be
much longer.
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Figure 1. Encryption (top): The text is hidden in random noise patterns generated from the public key pub. Subsequent additions hide the structure
of the noise patterns to make it harder to subtract the noise.
Decryption (bottom): Via the private key, every noise pattern generated from pub is “switched off” and hence the clear text is revealed from the sum.
concludes that x3 = 0 in the private key. Alice might notice
the attack by a suitable syntax check on the decoded text
(containing more than one bit), but the security of the key
pair is lost anyway.
This attack can be countered as follows. Bob seeds his
random number generator, which chooses the clauses and
generates the random functions Ri, with a hash of the salted
clear text. He then sends the salt together with the encrypted
message. If the clear text was long enough, it would take
Mallet very long to guess the right seed from the salt
alone (hence decoding the message). But knowing the salt
and the clear text, Alice can easily re-encrypt the message
after decryption and check whether the ciphertext has been
altered by Mallet. She rejects any faulty message, regardless
of the private key, hence not revealing any information.
2 ALGORITHMS
G
ENERATION of key pairs and the encryption al-
gorithm are discussed in this section. The public
key, pub , is a “planted” random k-SAT instance for
k ∈ N with k > 2. This is a Boolean function in
n ∈ N variables, pub : Bn → B, which is given as a conjunc-
tion of m ∈ N many k-clauses, cj : Bk ⊂ Bn → B, together
with a truth assignment, the private key priv ∈ pub−1(1). In
summary
pub : x 7→
m∧
j=1
cj(x) , cj : x 7→
k∨
i=1
(xI(i,j) ⊕ s(i, j)) , (13)
where the signs s(i, j) ∈ B determine wether the literal xI
is negated. To discuss the complexity of the algorithms, we
use the notation
O(f) :=
{
g : N→ R ∣∣ lim sup
n→∞
|g(n)|
f(n)
<∞
}
, (14)
o(f) :=
{
g : N→ R ∣∣ lim sup
n→∞
|g(n)|
f(n)
= 0
}
, (15)
and Θ(f) := O(f) \ o(f) for f : N→ R+.
2.1 Key Generation
A key pair is generated as follows:
1) Choose the private key priv ∈ Bn at random.
2) Generate the clause cj by randomly choosing k distinct
integers Ij,i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and “signs” si ∈ B.
3) If cj(priv) accept the clause, otherwise reject it.2
4) Repeat until m clauses have been generated.
In other words, the data to be generated and stored for
the each key pair is
I : {1, . . . ,m} × {1, . . . , k} → {1, . . . , n} (16)
and s : {1, . . . ,m} × {1, . . . , k} → B , (17)
hence the length of the public key is in Θ(mk(log(n) + 1)).
The run time is proportional to the public key length3.
It is very important to generate hard instances as public
keys. Therefore we must ensure that priv is (almost surely)
the unique solution, i.e.m needs to be larger than the critical
value, m > mc = αc(k)n for some αc(k) ∈ Θ(1), see [4].
Choosing m rather close to mc yields the most difficult in-
stance. This is well known in similar setups, see Appendix E
for some of our own benchmarks. Choosing m ∝ n for fixed
k leads to a public key length of Θ(n log(n)). A different
scaling of m with n is not recommended, since the resulting
SAT instances then become much easier to solve.
2.2 Encryption and Decryption
We fix parameters α, β ∈ N with 2 ≤ β  α to tune the run
time and security of the encryption.
1) Choose α many tuples of β many distinct clauses at
random, J : {1, . . . , α}×{1, . . . , β} → {1, . . . ,m} such
that J(i, a) 6= J(i, b) for all a 6= b.
2) The ciphertext encoding y ∈ B is the algebraic normal
form (ANF) of
g = y ⊕
α⊕
i=1
β⊕
a=1
c¯J(i,a) ∧Ri,a . (18)
2. If the algorithm is to have finite worst case run time, one should
modify the clause instead of generating a new one at random. Notice,
however, that the number of signs to flip has to be chosen carefully if
the resulting distribution of public keys is to be unchanged. See e.g. [5].
3. If clauses are rejected this is tha case with probability exponentially
close to 1.
3Here Ri,a is a random function. It depends on the same
set of variables as the clauses {cJ(i,b)|b 6= a} and is
generated in ANF where each possible term occurs with
probability 1/2.
3) The decryption “algorithm” is g(priv) = y.
In choosing the clauses in Step 1, some care is to be taken:
(a) To counter attacks discussed in Section 3.1.2, it is prefer-
able if the clauses within one tuple share variables. This
is particularly important if one of the clauses does not
contain negations, i.e. s(i, 1) = . . . = s(i, k) = 0.
(b) We have to ensure that each tuple shares at least one
clause with another tuple to counter the attack dis-
cussed in Section 3.2.
(c) Each clause of pub is to appear in some tuple as dis-
cussed in Section 3.3.
We can ensure (b) and (c) by choosing J as follows: First
choose a permutation σ ∈ Sm at random. Then set J(i, a) =
σ(i+a−1), where the indices are understood modulo m. In
this scheme α = m. To also ensure (a) one should enhance
the probability of neighbouring clauses, cσ(j) and cσ(j)+1, to
have variables in common when generating σ.
To turn the negated clauses in (18) into ANF, one can use
various identities, such as x∨y = x⊕y⊕xy, but x ∨ y = x¯y¯
is the most efficient one here. It leads to
1⊕ (x1 ⊕ s1) ∨ . . . ∨ (xk ⊕ sk) (19a)
= (x1 ⊕ s1 ⊕ 1) ∧ . . . ∧ (xk ⊕ sk ⊕ 1) . (19b)
The resulting ANF (obtained by distributing ∧ over ⊕) is
of length ≤ 2k. The run time to compute the ciphertext in
(18) as well as the length of the resulting ciphertext are in
O(α2βk). Consequently, we need to choose β ∈ O(log(m))
in order for the run time to be polynomial. The length can
be expected to be shorter than the run time by a factor > 2
due to the cancellation of terms in the sum and due to Ri,a
only containing 2(β−1)k−1 terms on average. If we choose
β = log2(m)/k and α ∝ m, we have α2βk ∝ m2. For β ∈
Θ(1), run time and ciphertext length formally only scale
with m, but for m ≈ 210 and β = k = 3 the pre-factor is
still comparable to m. In short, encryption with this setup
has complexity O(m2).
3 KNOWN ATTACKS AND IMPROVED SCHEMES
O
BVIOUSLY, the most pressing question is whether
the cipher introduced in Section 2 is really (post-
quantum) secure. We will not answer this ques-
tion, but discuss some attacks and counters in this
Section. Denote by Gb = Gb(pub) the set of all possible
ciphertexts encoding b ∈ B and by G = G1 ∪ G0 the set
of all ciphertexts. Since the problem of deriving the private
from the public key is known to be hard, we will focus
on attacks on the ciphertext. We will refer to the problem
of deciding for g ∈ G whether g ∈ G0 or g ∈ G1 as
the decoding problem. We do not have a proof that this
is a hard problem, although some related problems are (see
Appendix A). In this section we focus on some particular
attacks, i.e. algorithms that solve the decoding problem and
show that all of them have exponential run time, if the
parameters of the encryption algorithm are chosen suitably.
3.1 Simple Attacks
3.1.1 Enumeration of Ciphertexts Attack
Since the set of all possible ciphertexts for a given public key
is finite, a trivial brute force attack is to just enumerate it. In
order to prevent this attack, the encryption parameters α
and β need to be large enough. More precisely, the number
of possible ciphertexts is roughly(
m
β
)α
2αβ((β−1)k) . (20)
We can ensure this number to be (super) exponentially large
by choosing
n ∈ O(αβ) . (21)
Further we should apply some fixed invertible linear trans-
formation to the message bit vector before encoding. This
way, decoding a few of the ciphertext bits does not reveal
any clear text bits.
3.1.2 Constant Term Probability Attack
Another rather trivial attack is to determine g(0, . . . , 0) for
a ciphertext g ∈ G. This is just the presence or absence of
the constant 1 in the ANF, which is where the message bit
enters. Hence this property must not distinguish G0 from
G1.
The ANF of a random clause of length k contains a
constant 1 with probability 1 − 2−k, hence the probability
for each summand in (18) to contain the constant 1 is
2−k−1. This is rather small, but a variant of the central limit
theorem is in this case on our side, see Appendix B. As a
consequence, the probability for g(0, . . . , 0) = 1 tends to
1/2 exponentially quickly with αβ at the scale of
αβ  2k . (22)
Considering the enumeration attack from Section 3.1.1, the
bound established in (21) is much stronger than (22). In
other words, the cipher resists the constant term attack if
parameters are chosen such that it resists the enumeration
attack.
A more refined version of this attack focuses on those
clauses which can contribute a summand 1, namely those ci
which do not contain any negation. For those,
c¯i = (xi1⊕1) . . . (xik⊕1) = 1⊕xi1⊕. . .⊕xi1xi2 . . . xik (23)
contributes a constant to the ciphertext sum iff the corres-
ponding Ri also contains the constant 1. An attacker can try
to judge wether the latter is the case by looking for the order
k term, xi1xi2 . . . xik , in the ciphertext sum. The same term
could be caused by another clause depending on the same
variables, but such a clause is part of pub with vanishing
probability for large m ∝ n. Hence we need to ensure that
ci shares at least one variable with another clause in the
same tuple or that another clause in the same tuple contains
no negated literals. Both of these can lead to the appearance
of the same order k term, see the example in Section 1.1.
43.1.3 Ciphertext Value Probability Attack
An attacker can try to estimate |{g−1(1)}| for any g ∈ G
by evaluating g on a random set of trial inputs. Hence
this value must not distinguish G1 from G0. This attack is
structurally very similar to the constant term attack (Sec-
tion 3.1.2). For each clause c of length k, the number of
inputs on which c is 1 is |{c−1(1)}| = 2k − 1. The prob-
ability of all summands in the ciphertext g in Equation (18)
evaluating to 1 on a random input is the same as for none
of the summands to contain a constant 1, if R = 1 with
probability 1/2. Even if the Rs are chosen such that they
evaluates to 1 only on ∝ 2−βk many inputs, choosing
α k (24)
still ensures that the probability for g(1) = 1 is exponentially
close to 1/2 according to Appendix B. Since β ∈ O(log(m))
for run time reasons, condition (24) is again ensured by (21).
3.2 Decoding Attack
More sophisticated attacks exploit the structure of the
cipher. Any function in g ∈ G is necessarily of the form
g = y ⊕
m⊕
i=1
c¯iRi
for some functions Ri (see Appendix C). A crucial point
of our whole scheme is that polynomial long division does
not work over finite fields such as B, because the degree is
not well behaved under addition and multiplication in the
polynomial ring. This can be seen in the Example 1.1. A
simpler example is xn+1 = x and hence e.g. x2y⊕y2x5 = 0.
Such “collisions” are sufficiently likely to secure our cipher,
if the random functions RI are chosen in a good way.
Attacks on the structure of the encoding algorithm start
with the following observation. The set of all clauses which
depend only on literals in a small set {xi1 , . . . , xiM } has an
expected size of (
M
k
)
m
nk
, (25)
which is exponentially small for M ∈ o(m). In other words,
a small set of clauses C is most likely uniquely determ-
ined by D(C) :=
⋃
ci∈C D(ci) where D(c(x1, . . . , xk)) ={x1, . . . , xk} denotes the variables on which c depends.
This means that most likely all tuples J(i, 1), . . . , J(i, β)
used to generate our ciphertext g in Section 2.2 can be
identified from the ANF of g. For a given tuple, this leaves
2β(β−1)k choices for the random functions associated with
it. If we choose β = log2(m)/k (see Section 2.2) then
2β(β−1)k ≈ mlog(m). This is super polynomial in m, but,
for reasonable values of m, an attacker can still produce all
possible summands associated with this tuple and try to add
them to g. He can check whether all terms involving vari-
ables from this tuple cancel. However, the same variables
will occur also in other tuples. In fact, we should ensure
that also some of the clauses from this tuple appear in other
tuples. This will leave the attacker with a few possibilities
for the random function, which can only be decided once
the touples sharing clauses are decided as well. But since all
tuples are connected (indirectly) by sharing clauses, the run
time of this attack is exponential in α which we chose to be
of the order of m.
3.3 Reduced SAT Problem Attack
If an attacker can learn that only a certain subset of clauses
was used in the cipher, he can try to solve the SAT problem
given by the conjunction of only those clauses. If the ratio of
used clauses to variables appearing in those clauses is small
enough, the SAT problem is easily solvable and any solution
can be used to decode the ciphertext.
To resist this attack, care is to be taken in Step (1) of
the encryption (Section 2.2). The set of all clauses used,
C =
⋃α
i=1
⋃β
a=1{cJ(i,a)} should not depend on more than
|C|n/mmany different variables. Furthermore, reducing the
number of clauses used, even at constant clauses to variables
ratio, effectively reduces the key length. Overall, we should
ensure that all clauses are used in the cipher.
3.4 Oracle Attack
The communication according to the algorithms from Sec-
tion 2.2 is vulnerable to the following attack: If the recipient
is expected to send a reply to an encrypted message, an
attacker can fake a ciphertext by replacing a literal with a
guessed truth value. If he can learn from the reply whether
the ciphertext was correctly decoded, he gets a strong hint,
or even evidence, for the assignment of this literal in the
private key. Repeating the attack in a suitable scheme will
reveal the full private key. This is a severe attack which
limits the scope of application of the random cipher to such
cases where replies are only send to authenticated com-
munication partners. Post-quantum authentication could be
provided by e.g. a hash-based scheme, see [1, Hash-based
Digital Signature Schemes]), or by our identification scheme
introduced in Section 5. One could also use only one-
time key pairs for encryption, again with the problem of
authenticating the new keys.
Instead, we have developed two improved version of
our scheme. The one which we consider superior resist the
oracle attack completely and is described in Section 3.4.1.
In special circumstances, also the version described in Ap-
pendix D might be useful. The latter makes the oracle attack
substantially more difficult and preserves the probabilistic
nature of the cipher.
3.4.1 Proof of Honest Encryption
The version of the encryption/decryption scheme described
here prevents the oracle attack completely without increas-
ing the complexity of the encryption algorithm. Key gen-
eration is unchanged, but decryption becomes as complex
as encryption and the feature of a stochastic cipher is lost.
More precisely, using the cipher discussed in Section 2.2,
the ciphertext is not a function of the public key and clear
text. In particular, even if Bob encodes the same clear
text twice, he will get different ciphertexts. This makes
repetition-attacks impossible and the algorithm is very res-
istant against rainbow table type attacks. It is, of course,
only pseudo random. In other words, the ciphertext is a
function of public key, clear text and the seed of the pseudo
random number generator (PRNG), implicitly used to make
the random choices. This can be used to verify that the
ciphertext was not tempered with in order to oracle the
private key, at the cost of loosing the rainbow-resistance.
The latter can then be restored in the usual way by salting.
5Concretely, key generation as described in Section 2.1
stays untouched and also encryption is done as explained in
Section 2.2, but the sender starts by seeding the PRNG with
a specific seed, computed from clear text and a salt. The
salt is then to be part of the ciphertext. After decryption of
the ciphertext (applying it to the private key), the recipient
computes the seed from the clear text and the salt. He then
checks that the received ciphertext text matches that one
that is computed from the public key, the clear text, and
the seed according to the fixed encryption algorithm. This
way, oracle attacks can be detected without revealing any
information.
The cost to pay is that the implementation of the PRNG
and the encryption algorithm on the sender and receiver
side have to match and that the receiver has to re-do
the most time consuming part of the whole scheme, the
encryption. Further more, the clear text needs to be long
enough (of order n) in order to prevent a brute force attack
on the seed. Notice that the seed, as computed from the salt
and clear text, is to be considered as a key for decoding the
particular message. If an attacker can find the seed he can
decode the ciphertext without the private key.
4 HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION
T
HE cipher described in Section 2.2 is fully homo-
morphic. That means that if Alice wants to know
the value of any function f : Bn → Bn on x ∈ Bn,
she can encrypt x bit-wise into the ciphertext
c = (c1, . . . , cn) : Bn → Bn as above and then send c
to Charley, who has more computation power available.
Charley computes f ◦ c and sends this processed ciphertext
back to Alice. She decrypts
(f ◦ c) (priv) = f(c(priv)) = f(x) . (26)
Notice that oracle attacks by Charley can not be
countered by a proof of honest encryption requirement in
this setting (see Section 3.4), or else Alice would have to redo
the whole computation. Anyway, due to the cipher being
malleable, trust in Charly to honestly compute f is needed.
One might also use multi-Key encryption as described in
Appendix D to check that Charley computes honestly and
discard the key-pair otherwise.
A more severe drawback is that any computation on the
ciphertext “bits” ci, while not introducing any noise, does
increase the length of the ciphertext. In particular, if |ci|
denotes the number of summands in the ANF of ci, then
|ci⊕cj | ≤ |ci|+ |ci| and |ci∧cj | ≤ |ci||ci|, where the bounds
will likely (almost) saturate for short ciphertexts. As soon as
about half of all possible terms are present, i.e. |ci| ≈ 2n−1,
the length will likely not grow further. But since originally
|ci| ∝ m ∝ n, this means that multiplication leads to an
exponential growth in the ciphertext length. Consequently,
only few multiplications are feasible in our scheme.
This growth in length can be traded for “noise” by
discarding all terms longer (counting the number of literals
in a product) than a fixed length L. The probability of such
terms being satisfied by the (unknown) private key is 2−L,
i.e. if only 2L terms are discarded, the ciphertext probably
still decrypts correctly. The final length of the ciphertext
bits is then limited to 2L, but the “noise” generated by
multiplications will at some point make it impossible to
decrypt the ciphertext, hence effectively also limiting the
number of possible multiplications in f . In this sense our
scheme is only somewhat homomorphic and bootstraping
is needed to make it fully homomorphic without the cipher-
texts becoming unfeasibly large.
5 IDENTIFICATION AND SIGNATURES
I
N this sections we introduce a zero-knowledge
proof for our key pairs. This leads to an identific-
ation and signature scheme, which is independ-
ent from the encryption scheme discussed above,
apart from sharing the same type of public/private key
pairs. In fact, the scheme proposed here is a variant of the
one by Blum based on the Hamitlon cycle problem [2]. The
latter is NP-complete, hence polynomial-time equivalent to
SAT, but one can apply the ideas more directly.
5.1 Zero-Knowledge Proof/Identification
Let pub again be a k-SAT instance in n boolean variables
and priv ∈ pub−1(1) a solution only known to Alice. The
zero-knowledge proof consists of K rounds, each of which
proceeds as follows:
1) Alice chooses a random invertible function f :
Bn → Bn and commits to f∗(pub) = pub ◦ f
and to f−1(priv). More precisely, the commitment
to f∗(pub) is to be in the form of committing to
each literal in the pull back of the form, i.e. to each
f∗(xI(1, 1)), f∗(xI(1, 2)), . . . , f∗(xI(m, k)).
2) Bob chooses whether Alice should reveal either
2.a) all of f∗(pub) or
2.b) f−1(priv) together with
{
f∗(xI(i,ai))|i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
}
,
where Alice randomly chooses the ai ∈ {1, . . . , k} such
that f∗(xI(i,ai))
(
f−1(priv)
)
= 1 for all i.
In this scheme Bob either verifies that Alice did not cheat
when generating f∗(pub) or that she indeed knows a solu-
tion. Fake proofs will hence be discovered with probability
1/2 each round and the probability to get through all rounds
is 2−K .
The run time of the above scheme depends on what kind
of functions we allow for f . If we only use permutations4,
the run time for generating the permutation, its inverse
and reshuffling priv is O(n) and O(m) for re-labelling pub .
However, in this case the number of 1s and 0s in the public
key is leaked by revealing f−1(priv). To avoid this, we
should at least add a random affine shift s ∈ Bn to the
permutation, i.e. f(x) = σ(x) + s.
5.2 Signatures
By a Fiat-Shamir heuristic we can convert the above inter-
active identification into a signature scheme. To this end, let
h : B∗ → BK be a cryptographic hash function. To sign a
document:
1) Alice generates K random functions, f1, . . . , fK , as in
Section 5.1 and commits to all f−1i (priv) and f
∗(pub).
4. Here the permutation acts on Bn by permuting the coefficients
with respect to the fixed base and correspondingly on formulas by
permuting the indices of the variables.
62) She then computes a hash of the document to be signed,
concatenated with (a suitable encoding of) her commit-
ments. Denote the latter by C .
3) She reveals the information as in Step 2 of Section 5.1,
choosing 2.a) or 2.b) in the ith round if the ith bit of
the hash is 0 or 1, respectively. Denote this revealed
information by R.
The signature consists of C and R. It is verified by Bob
by checking that the correct information was revealed by
re-computing the hash. He also checks that the revealed
information is valid as in Section 5.1, of course.
To fake this signature, Alice could fake the zero-
knowledge proofs and generate signatures until, by chance,
a valid one is generated. However, the probability for this to
happen is as small as cheating in the identification scheme,
i.e. exponentially small in the number of rounds.
6 CONCLUSION
T
HE motivation for developing the public key
crypto-scheme based on the Boolean Satisfiab-
ility Problem discussed in this paper is to fill
the arsenal of post-quantum cryptography with
some fresh ammunition. The simplicity of the scheme de-
veloped in this paper might be an advantage over the well
known post-quantum schemes. More conceptually, we are
not aware of any scheme which uses random ciphertexts
in a similar way (compare to Figure 1). Furthermore, there
is quite some freedom in the details of the cipher, in par-
ticular in choosing probability distributions for the random
functions RI . This makes it possible to adapt the algorithm,
if more sophisticated attacks are discovered in the future.
The cipher presented in Section 2.2 has undergone some
evolution to resist all attacks which came to our mind. The
version using a proof honest encryption has no vulnerab-
ilities currently known to us, but of course much more
crypto-analysis is needed and the reader is invited to devise
stronger attacks to challenge and improve the algorithm.
In particular, we have not proven that it is (NP-)hard to
decipher a message without knowledge of the private key.
It is the problem of deducing the private from the public
key that is NP-hard, i.e. “post-quantum”, by construction.
The same is true for the signature scheme presented in
Section 5.2, which is independent of our encryption scheme.
It is analogous to Blum’s well known scheme [2], adapted
to our SAT scenario.
A notable feature of our cipher is that, in principle, it is
fully homomorpic, i.e. applying any function to the cipher-
text bit vector and then decoding yields the same result
as decoding and then applying the function. However, as
discussed in Section 4, the ciphertext might become unfeas-
ibly long if to many multiplications are applied to it, hence
our scheme is effectively only somewhat homomorphic.
The oracle attack mentioned in Section 3.4 is a stronger
incarnation of malleability. It is a severe generic attack on
any cipher consisting of Boolean functions. Enforcing honest
encryption, as explained in Section 3.4.1, is a generic counter.
The multi-key version of our scheme described in Ap-
pendix D is another work around, however, not completely
resistant. Although it only reveals much less information,
the key pairs still need to be changed regularly, but here
this could here be feasible. In some special situations, like
using our scheme for homomorphic encryption, the multi-
key version might be preferable. Encryption is considerably
more complex than key generation and decryption, which
in particular yields some protection against DOS attacks for
multi-key schemes.
The length of the public key and the run time of the
key generation algorithm scale as O(n log n) with the length
of the private key n. The length of the ciphertext and
the run time of the encryption algorithm per bit of clear
text scale as O(m1+) with  ≥ 0 and we have identified
2αc(k)n > m > αc(k)n as the relevant parameter range for
hard planted SAT instances (see Appendix E). The crucial
question is how big n should be in practice today. At the
SAT Competition 20145, random 3-SAT instances of size
n ≈ 104 have been solved form ≈ mc in less than one hour.6
These instances were selected in order to be solvable within
that time, but still they are randomly generated with non-
negligible probability. Our own benchmarks (Appendix E)
show that the MiniSat solver [3] can not break keys of length
n > 210 ≈ 103 on a modern PC using one thread. Taking
large scale parallelisation into account, we should at least
choose n > 211, but in view of the SAT Competition results,
n > 214 seems more advisable.
Key generation is very fast and choosing even n > 107
is not a problem here. However, encryption with our not
very much optimised proof of concept implementation [6]
already takes time of the order of few seconds per bit of
clear text to encode with α = m = 5n = 5 × 210 and
β = 3 and still tenth of seconds per bit for β = 2 and the
other parameters as before. Although there is certainly room
for improving the implementation, the constraint β ≥ 2
means that the run time of the encryption algorithm is in
O(m1+) with  ≥ 3/5 for m ≈ 210. These run times are
not yet very well suited for practical applications. However,
the situation could be improved by advancing away from
bit-wise encryption. Encoding longer messages at once is
an interesting topic for future research. One could use the
(vector space) embedding of polynomials with binary coef-
ficients into polynomials with coefficients in any finite field
Fq to encode the message in a shorter q-adic representation
decimal by decimal. However, increasing q makes polyno-
mial long division more likely possible, hence the security
considerations in Section 3.2 need to be seriously reviewed
in this setting. If one can counter the attack from Section 3.3
by other means than using all clauses, smaller α would
also lead to a substantial speed up. Anyway, before more
research builds on the ideas presented here, we would like
our algorithm to be challenged by more advanced attacks
in order to improve it. Furthermore, the problems which we
have proven to be NP-hard (see Appendix A) are still not
very close to the decoding problem. To build faith in this
cipher really being post-quantum secure, more research in
this direction is in order.
5. http://www.satcompetition.org/2014/
6. E.g. http://satcompetition.org/edacc/sc14/experiment/24/
result/?id=23531
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8APPENDIX A
SOME HARD PROBLEMS
In this section, we establish that some problems related to
the decoding problem (see Section 3) are hard. To this end,
fix a public key pub and assume that pub−1(1) = {priv}. The
partitioning of ciphertexts G = G0 ∪G1 is characterised by
G1 = {g ∈ G | pub ⇒ g} (27)
G0 = {g ∈ G | pub ⇒ g¯} . (28)
Deriving the private key is harder than decoding, since
∀g ∈ G : g ∈ Gg(priv). Assuming that all g ∈ G are given in
such a form that evaluating g(priv) is possible in polynomial
time, the decoding problem is in NP.
If G would contain the elementary functions X := {x 7→
xi} then the decoding problem would be (polynomial time)
equivalent to deriving the private key, hence solving the
SAT problem. A set of functions Y of polynomials size
will be called “hard to decode”, if solving the decoding
problem for each f ∈ Y determines (by a polynomial time
algorithm) the solution of the SAT problem. The following
sets of functions are hard to decode:
1) The elementary functions X
2) Any set of functions containing a subset that is hard to
decode
3) {f ⊕ sf |f ∈ Y } where sf ∈ B are known and Y is hard
to decode
4) {f ⊕ g|f ∈ Y } where Y is hard to decode and g is any
Boolean function
5) {f ∧ g|f ∈ Y } ∪ {f ∧ g¯|f ∈ Y } with Y , g as above
6) {xi ∧ f |f ∈ Y, xi ∈ X} with X , Y as above
7) {xi ∨ f |f ∈ Y, xi ∈ X} with X , Y as above
(3) is hard to decode since f ⊕ s ∈ Gb ↔ f ∈ Gb⊕s. (4) is
hard to decode since we can decide for each f ⊕ g whether
or not it is implied by pub , then assume that g(priv) = 0
and use that Y is hard to decode to produce a trial solution
priv ′. If pub(priv ′) 6= 1 then g(priv) = 1 and we can use (3).
(5) is hard to decide since one of the two sets evaluates to
{0} on priv . Since there are only two possibilities for g(priv)
one can check both in polynomial time, similar to (4). In (6)
(and similarly in (7)) we can decide {x1 ∧ f}. If this turns
out to be a subset of G0 then we likely have x1(priv) = 0
and we proceed deciding {x2 ∧ f}. After polynomial time
we either arrive at some xi(priv) = 1 and can hence derive
priv or conclude that priv = (0, . . . , 0).
The above construction shows that some generic prob-
lems similar to the decoding problem are hard to decide.
Notice, however, that the sender can not (on purpose) en-
code a message of polynomial length into a hard to encode
set of functions in polynomial time, or else he would solve
the SAT problem.
APPENDIX B
BOOLEAN CENTRAL LIMIT THEOREM
Consider a set of i.i.d. Boolean variables xi, with p1 :=
prob(xi = 1). Then
p⊕0 := prob
(
M⊕
i=1
xi = 0
)
=
bM/2c∑
j=0
(
M
2j
)
p2j1 (1− p1)M−2j
(29)
p⊕1 := prob
(
M⊕
i=1
xi = 1
)
=
dM/2e−1∑
j=0
(
M
2j + 1
)
p2j+11 (1− p1)M−2j−1
(30)
and hence |p⊕0 − p⊕1 | = |1 − 2p1|M converges to 0 for any
0 < p1 < 1 and M → ∞ at exponential speed. In other
words, for large enough M we have p⊕1 ≈ 1/2 irrespective
of p1. Large enough here means M  −1/ log |1 − 2p1|,
which means M  p−11 /2 for small p1  1/2.
APPENDIX C
STRUCTURE OF CIPHERTEXTS
In this section we discuss which functions g can, in prin-
ciple, be constructed from the public key pub without
knowledge of the private key, such that pub ⇒ g, i.e.
g ∈ G1. We will therefore assume that only the clauses ci
of pub =
∧m
i=1 ci can be used as the elementary building
blocks for which pub ⇒ ci is known.
Any encryption algorithm of the type discussed in this
paper will lead to sets of ciphertexts G and Gb which are
contained in the sets G˜ and G˜b, respectively. The latter are
constructed as follows
1) 1 ∈ G˜1 and ci ∈ G˜1 for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
2) f ∈ G˜a, g ∈ G˜b ⇒ f ⊕ g ∈ G˜a⊕b, f ∧ g ∈ G˜a∧b and
f ∨ g ∈ G˜a∨b. In particular, g¯ = 1⊕ g ∈ G˜b¯.
3) f ∈ G˜1, g arbitrary⇒ f ∨ g ∈ G˜1 and f¯ ∧ g ∈ G˜0.
The sets that can be constructed from (1) using (2) and
(3) are
G˜0 =
{
m∧
i=1
c¯ifi | fi : Bn → B
}
(31)
G˜1 = {1⊕ f | f ∈ G0} . (32)
These are stable under (2), since f ∨g = 1⊕ f¯ g¯ = f ⊕g⊕fg
and f = 1⊕ f¯ . Further, the set of Boolean functions used in
(2) is complete.
APPENDIX D
MULTI-KEY CHAINS
In some situations, the proof of honest encryption method
laid out in Section 3.4 might not be favourable, for example
if the feature of a (pseudo) random cipher is crucial or re-
computing the encryption on the receiver side is to costly.
In such cases, we can still substantially weaken the oracle
attack. The key idea here is to introduce redundancy, which
increases key length and all run times by a constant factor.
The private/public key chain now consists of γ ∈ N
different private/public key pairs. To encrypt a message,
each bit is to be encrypted with each of the public keys, i.e.
the ciphertext for one bit now consists of γ many Boolean
functions in ANF. In a valid ciphertext, all of these functions
evaluate to the same value upon inserting the respective
private keys.
After decoding, the recipient has to decide whether or
not to accept the message (bit), if the ciphertext is invalid.
9Rejecting all invalid ciphertexts would reveal as much in-
formation about the private key as the simple version of
Section 2. Therefore we fix a threshold t ∈ {2, . . . , γ/2}
and accept the bit with value given by the majority, if the
minority is smaller than t. To properly choose t, we consider
the two possible outcomes of the attack:
1) If the message is rejected, the attacker learns that more
than the (known) threshold t of the bits he guessed did
not match the private keys.
2) If the message is accepted, the attacker will learn
whether or not he guessed the majority of bits right
(from the reply of the receiver).
To keep the information leakage about the private key
as small as possible, we should choose t large in order to
make (1) unlikely. More precisely, if f ∈ {0. . . . , γ} of the
encoded versions of the bit are manipulated by replacing
one variable with a guessed value (such that the change in
the function influences its value), the probability of rejection
is
probr(t, f) =
1
2f
∑
t≤T≤f
(
f
T
)
, (33)
which can be expressed through the error function for large
f . If f is close or even equal to t, the attacker gains substan-
tial information, but for this attack, the success probability
is exponentially small in t.
In the opposite case of choosing f close to γ, the attack
is most likely detected if t is small enough. Concretely
choosing e.g.
t =
γ
2
− c
2
√
γ (34)
with c = 3 means that more than 99.7% (for large γ) of the
attacks will be detected with hardly any information gain for
the attacker. More precisely, the probability of a successfully
attack of this type scales down super exponentially (with the
complementary error function) and is below 10−8 already
for c = 6. In practice, choosing t ∝ γ with a proportionality
factor slightly smaller than 1/2 should be most reasonable.
The attacker gains most information from an attack with
probr(t, f) ≈ 1/2, i.e. f ≈ 2t. This attack being rejected or
not indicates that more or less than half of the private key
bits were guessed correctly. Gathering this knowledge from
O(γ2) attacks in a suitable scheme will reveal the value of
all γ bits of the keys with a high confidence level on the
attackers side. Hence the multi-key hardened version is not
fully resistant against the oracle attack, but the attack will
almost surely be noticed before substantial information is
leaked. This invalidates the authenticity of the attacker in
an authenticated communication. Even if information was
leaked, not all keys in the chain have to be replaced, which
limits the damage of a successful attack.
One can improve the scheme a little more by also
choosing γ at random for each decryption, but still stat-
istical analysis will eventually reveal the private key bits.
Hence the proof of honest encryption scheme introduced
in Section 3.4.1 is certainly more secure than the multi-key
scheme.
APPENDIX E
BENCHMARKS
We have conducted some simple bench marks for breaking
the public key, i.e. solving the SAT instance, using MiniSat
[3]. It is well known that random instances are the hardest
for m ≈ mc = αc(k)n. For the planted instances that we use
as public keys, it turns out that the hardest instances have
slightly more clauses.
E.1 3-SAT
For k = 3 we find (see Figure 7 to 2) that the hardest
instance have m ≈ 5n where mc ≈ 4.2n [4]. In Figure 2
we show the run time of MiniSat for various random
instances generated by our key generator as a function of
the number of variables for fixed m/n = 4.3. This is very
close to the critical ratio. Fitting an exponential function
to the minimal run times, we extrapolate that one should
choose n100 ≈ 1500 to ensure that the MiniSat solver
would take at least 100 years to break the public key.
For m/n = 4.5, as displayed in Figure 3, we find the
same n100 within the error of our approximation, but for
m/n = 5 (Figure 4) n100 < 1000 is significantly smaller.
Increasing m/n further leads to an increases in n100 which
again reaches n100 ≈ 1500 for m/n = 8. Consequently,
we choose m/n = 5 and a private key length n = 210
for k = 3 as the default values for the proof-of-concept
implementation [6]. This leads to a public key length of
about k ∗m ∗ (log2(n) + 1) ≈ 165 kbit. Notice that the keys
generated with these parameters can be considered “PC-
secure” but securing the keys against more sophisticated
massively parallel solvers rather requires n & 211.
E.2 4-SAT
For k = 4 the critical ratio of clauses to variables is about
mc = 9.8n. Using m/n = 10 our MiniSat benchmarks
indicate n100 ≈ 350. So the private key size can be reduced
significantly by using higher k. However, the public key
size for these parameters (≈ 133 kbit) is comparable to the
one for k = 3. This means that the run time for encryption
with higher k is significantly longer (exponential in k, see
Section 2.2). Overall, it does not pay off to use higher values
of k.
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Figure 2. MiniSat run times for m/n = 4.3.
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Figure 3. MiniSat run times for m/n = 4.5.
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Figure 4. MiniSat run times for m/n = 5.
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Figure 5. MiniSat run times for m/n = 6.
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Figure 6. MiniSat run times for m/n = 7.
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Figure 7. MiniSat run times for m/n = 8.
